|Asunto:||[LEA-Venezuela] venezuela (fwd)|
|Fecha:||Sabado, 13 de Abril, 2002 10:19:50 (-0600)|
|Autor:||karl h schwerin <schwerin @...edu>
Karl Schwerin SnailMail: Dept. of Anthropology
Univ. of New Mexico Albuquerque, NM 87131
Cultural anthropology...is valuable because it is constantly rediscovering
the normal. Edward Sapir (1949:151)
---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2002 12:23:40 -0700
From: Beth Baker-Cristales <bcristales@...>
Coup in Venezuela: An Eyewitness Account
By Gregory Wilpert
The orchestration of the coup was impeccable and, in all likelihood,
planned a long time ago. Hugo Chavez, the fascist communist dictator of
Venezuela could not stand the truth and thus censored the media
relentlessly. For his own personal gain and that of his henchmen (and
henchwomen, since his cabinet had more women than any previous
Venezuelan government's), he drove the country to the brink of economic
ruin. In the end he proceeded to murder those who opposed him. So as to
reestablish democracy, liberty, justice, and prosperity in Venezuela and
so as to avoid more bloodshed, the chamber of commerce, the union
federation, the church, the media, and the management of Venezuela's oil
company, in short: civil society and the military decided that enough is
enough-that Chavez had his chance and that his experiment of a "peaceful
democratic Bolivarian revolution" had to come to an immediate end.
This is, of course, the version of events that the officials now in
charge and thus also of the media, would like everyone to believe. So
what really happened? Of course I don't know, but I'll try to represent
the facts as I witnessed them.
First of all, the military is saying that the main reason for the coup
is what happened today, April 11. "Civil society," as the opposition
here refers to itself, organized a massive demonstration of perhaps
100,000 to 200,000 people to march to the headquarters of Venezuela's
oil company, PDVSA, in defense of its fired management. The day leading
up to the march all private television stations broadcast advertisements
for the demonstration, approximately once every ten minutes. It was a
successful march, peaceful, and without government interference of any
kind, even though the march illegally blocked the entire freeway, which
is Caracas' main artery of transportation, for several hours.
Supposedly at the spur of the moment, the organizers decided to re-route
the march to Miraflores, the president's office building, so as to
confront the pro-government demonstration, which was called in the last
minute. About 5,000 Chavez-supporters had gathered there by the time the
anti-government demonstrators got there. In-between the two
demonstrations were the city police, under the control of the
oppositional mayor of Caracas, and the National Guard, under control of
the president. All sides claim that they were there peacefully and did
not want to provoke anyone. I got there just when the opposition
demonstration and the National Guard began fighting each other. Who
started the fight, which involved mostly stones and tear gas, is, as is
so often the case in such situations, nearly impossible to tell. A
little later, shots were fired into the crowds and I clearly saw that
there were three parties involved in the shooting, the city police,
Chavez supporters, and snipers from buildings above. Again, who shot
first has become a moot and probably impossible to resolve question. At
least ten people were killed and nearly 100 wounded in this gun
battle-almost all of them demonstrators.
One of the Television stations managed to film one of the three sides in
this battle and broadcast the footage over and over again, making it
look like the only ones shooting were Chavez supporters from within the
demonstration at people beyond the view of the camera. The media over
and over again showed the footage of the Chavez supporters and implied
that they were shooting at an unarmed crowd. As it turns out, and as
will probably never be reported by the media, most of the dead are
Chavez supporters. Also, as will probably never be told, the snipers
were members of an extreme opposition party, known as Bandera Roja.
These last two facts, crucial as they are, will not be known because
they do not fit with the new mythology, which is that Chavez armed and
then ordered his supporters to shoot at the opposition demonstration.
Perhaps my information is incorrect, but what is certain is that the
local media here will never bother to investigate this information. And
the international media will probably simply ape what the local media
reports (which they are already doing).
Chavez' biggest and perhaps only mistake of the day, which provided the
last remaining proof his opposition needed for his anti-democratic
credentials, was to order the black-out of the private television
stations. They had been broadcasting the confrontations all afternoon
and Chavez argued that these broadcasts were exacerbating the situation
and should, in the name of public safety, be temporarily shut-down.
Now, all of "civil society," the media, and the military are saying that
Chavez has to go because he turned against his own people. Aside from
the lie this is, what is conveniently forgotten are all of the
achievements of the Chavez administration: a new democratic constitution
which broke the power monopoly of the two hopelessly corrupt and
discredited main parties and put Venezuela at the forefront in terms of
progressive constitutions; introduced fundamental land reform; financed
numerous progressive ecological community development projects;
cracked-down on corruption; promoted educational reform which schooled
over 1 million children for the first time and doubled investment in
education; regulated the informal economy so as to reduce the insecurity
of the poor; achieved a fairer price for oil through OPEC and which
significantly increased government income; internationally campaigned
tirelessly against neo-liberalism; reduced official unemployment from
18% to 13%; introduced a large-scale micro-credit program for the poor
and for women; reformed the tax system which dramatically reduced tax
evasion and increased government revenue; lowered infant mortality from
21% to 17%; tripled literacy courses; modernized the legal system, etc.,
Chavez' opposition, which primarily consisted of Venezuela's old guard
in the media, the union federation, the business sector, the church, and
the traditionally conservative military, never cared about any of these
achievements. Instead, they took advantage of their media monopoly to
turn public opinion against him and managed to turn his biggest
liability, his autocratic and inflammatory style, against him.
Progressive civil society had either been silenced or demonized as
violent Chavez fanatics.
At this point, it is impossible to know what will happen to Chavez'
"Bolivarian Revolution"-whether it will be completely abandoned and
whether things will return to Venezuela's 40-year tradition of
patronage, corruption, and rentierism for the rich. What one can say
without a doubt, is that by abandoning constitutional democracy, no
matter how unpopular and supposedly inept the elected president,
Venezuela's ruling class and its military show just how politically
immature they are and deal a tremendous blow to political culture
throughout Latin America, just as the coup against Salvador Allende did
in 1973. This coup shows once again that democracy in Latin America is a
matter of ruling class preference, not a matter of law.
If the United States and the democratic international community have the
courage to practice what they preach, then they should not recognize
this new government. Democrats around the world should pressure their
governments to deny recognition to Venezuela's new military junta or any
president they happen to choose. According to the Charter of the
Organization of American States (OAS), this would mean expelling
Venezuela from the OAS, as a U.S. state department official recently
threatened to do. Please call the U.S. state department or your foreign
ministry and tell them to withdraw their ambassadors from Venezuela.
An Imminent Coup in Venezuela?
by Gregory Wilpert
April 10, 2002
It appears that the strategy of President Chavez' opposition is to
create as much chaos and disorder in Venezuela as possible, so that
Chavez is left with no other choice than to call a state of emergency.
This, in turn could either lead to a military coup or U.S. military
Given that Venezuela has the largest oil reserves in the western
hemisphere; it is distinctly possible that the U.S. government is going
to intervene overtly, if it is not already doing so covertly. This means
that the current crisis in Venezuela is probably a planned conspiracy to
topple the Chavez government with the support of the U.S.
As I write this, on April 9, Venezuela's largest union federation, the
Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela (CTV) has called for a
two-day general strike. Venezuela's chamber of commerce, FEDECAMERAS,
has joined the strike and called on all of its affiliated businesses to
close for 48 hours.
This was the second time in four months that the two federations, of
labor unions and of business owners, decided to join forces and strike
against the leftist government of President Hugo Chavez. What is
happening in Venezuela? Why are these and many other forces uniting
Chavez took power in late 1998 in a landslide electoral victory, calling
for a "Bolivarian Revolution," in reference to Latin America's hero of
independence and Venezuela's favorite son, Simon Bolivar. Since then,
Chavez has tried to root out the entrenched powers of Venezuelan
society, represented by a political and economic elite, which had
governed Venezuela for over 40 years in a pseudo-democratic form by
alternating power between two entrenched political parties.
Chavez first reformed Venezuela's constitution, through a constitutional
assembly and a referendum, making it one of the most progressive
constitutions in the world. The old elite were nearly completely driven
from political power in the course of seven elections, which took place
between 1998 and 2000. However, the old elite of the labor unions, the
business sector, the church, and the media are still in power and have
recently begun making life as difficult as possible for Chavez.
Although Chavez originally had popularity a rating of around 80%, his
popularity has steadily declined in the past year, supposedly reaching
the low 30's now. Whether the reason for this decline was the slow pace
of his promised reforms, the lack of significant progress in reducing
corruption and poverty, or if it was because of the incessant media
assault on his government, is not clear - most likely it is because of a
combination of these factors.
The conflict between Chavez and the old elite has recently come to a
head. First, when Chavez passed a slew of 49 laws, which, among many
other measures, were supposed to increase the government's oil income
and redistribute land. The chamber of commerce vehemently opposed these
laws and decided to call for a general business strike on December 10.
Venezuela's labor union federation, the CTV, decided to join the strike,
supposedly out of concern for the harm the laws did to the business
sector and thus to employment in Venezuela.
More likely, though, the CTV's support of a general strike was in
retaliation for Chavez having forced the unions to carry out new
elections of the CTV's leadership and for not recognizing its
leadership, due to charges of fraud, when the old guard union leadership
declared itself the winner of the election and refused to submit the
official results and ballots to the government.
The second major issue, which has resulted in a serious challenge to
Chavez, occurred when Chavez appointed five new members loyal to him to
the board of directors of the state-owned oil company, PDVSA, the
largest oil company in the world and the third largest supplier of oil
to the U.S.
Also, he appointed a prominent leftist economist and long-time critic of
PDVSA as its president. The management of PDVSA cried out in protest,
arguing that the appointments were purely political and not based on
merit and thus threatened to undermine the company's independence and
Chavez has since countered that board members and president have always
been political appointments and that the state needed to regain control
over PDVSA because it has become increasingly inefficient, a state
within a state, whose top management is living a life of extreme luxury.
Furthermore, and less explicitly, Chavez wants to assure that PDVSA
adheres to OPEC's production quotas, so that the oil price remains at a
stable and profitable level. PDVSA, however, has a history of
undermining OPEC quotas because its management places a higher premium
on market share than on a good oil price.
Following a two weeks of protest and of labor slowdowns within PDVSA,
mostly on the part of management, the labor federation leadership of the
CTV, who all belong to the discredited old elite, decided to join the
conflict in support of PDVSA's management, arguing that it was acting in
solidarity with PDVSA workers in its call for a day-long general strike.
The chamber of commerce rapidly followed suit, seeing this as another
opportunity to humiliate and perhaps topple Chavez, and supported the
strike as well. Considering the first day a complete success, the CTV
and the chamber of commerce have decided to extend the general strike
another 24 hours. However, as PROVEA, Venezuela's human rights agency
has noted, even though Venezuela's constitution guarantees the right to
strike, the strike is completely illegal because it bypassed the legal
requirements for democratic legitimation of such a strike.
Given that a large majority of private businesses are members of the
chamber of commerce and oppose Chavez, the strike has appeared to be
quite successful. Whether workers actually believe in the strike and
intentionally stay away from work in protest to the government, is
almost impossible to tell, since most businesses were closed by
Many businesses were open and most of the informal sector was actively
selling its wares on the streets as usual. Of course, all government
offices and all banks, whose hours are regulated by the government, were
open. Together, these sectors account for about 40% of Venezuela's
The conflict in Venezuela has come to take on epic proportions, if one
listens to the rhetoric of the two sides of the conflict. Both sides
make extensive use of hyperbole, alternately calling the strike either a
complete and total failure or a complete and total success.
Other examples of how passionate and heated the debates have become are
reflected in the opposition's repeated references to Chavez as a
"totalitarian fascist dictator" who wants to "cubanize" Venezuela.
Chavez and his supporters, for their part, refer to the opposition as a
squalid ("escualido") corrupt oligarchy.
Both sets of labels are caricatures of the truth. Certainly, Venezuela's
oligarchical elite opposes Chavez, but the opposition to Chavez has
become quite strong and has grown far beyond the oligarchy, to include
many of his former friends and supporters. On the other hand, even
though Chavez uses a lot of inflammatory rhetoric, the opposition has
yet to find a single instance in which he has violated Venezuela's very
democratic constitution in any way.
Chavez' greatest failure, from a progressive point of view, probably
lies in his relatively autocratic style, which is why many of his former
supporters have become alienated from his government. Whenever someone
opposed his policies he has tended to reject them and cast them out of
his government circle.
The result has been a consistent loss of a relatively broad political
spectrum of government leadership and a significant turn-over in his
cabinet, making stable and consistent policy implementation quite
This loss of broad-based support has made itself felt particularly
strongly during the recent crises, making Chavez look more isolated than
he might otherwise be. Other than his party supporters, who are quite
significant in number and come mostly from the poor "barrios," the
progressive sectors of civil society have been neglected by Chavez and
have thus not been active. Instead, the conservative sectors of civil
society, such as the chamber of commerce and the old guard union
leadership are among the main mobilizers of civil society.
Still, Chavez' policies have been almost without exception progressive
in that they have supported land redistribution for poor farmers, title
to the self-built homes of the barrios, steady increases in the minimum
wage and of public sector salaries, and the enrollment of over 1 million
students in school who were previously excluded, to name just a few
In terms of international issues, Chavez has been on the forefront in
working for greater intra-Third World solidarity, in opposing
neo-liberalism, and in supporting Cuba.
Figuring out what this epic conflict is about has been somewhat
difficult for an outsider. Passions are so inflamed that it is
practically impossible to find calm and reasoned analyses about what is
going on. Are the chamber of commerce, the labor federation leadership,
the upper class, and significant sectors of the middle class really
primarily concerned about the "politicization" of PDVSA and the
appointment of a pro-government board of directors?
Perhaps. But does opposition to these appointments justify a general
strike? Definitely not. More likely these sectors are concerned that
politicization of PDVSA means a loss of access to Venezuela's cash-cow:
oil. Not only that, the most common complaints one hears about Chavez
have more to do with his style than with any concrete policies he has
implemented. There often is a racist undertone to such complaints,
implying that Chavez, because of his folksy and populist style and his
Indio appearance, is sub-human, a "negro."
It does not help that almost all of the media, except the one
government-run TV network, out of about five major TV networks, and one
out of approximately ten major newspapers is completely opposed to
The media regularly cover nearly every single opposition pronouncement
and rarely cover government declarations. Chavez, out of frustration
with the media has relentlessly attacked the media for belonging to the
old guard oligarchy and for printing nothing but lies, occasionally
threatening them with legal action for slander.
The media has, of course, responded in kind, by accusing Chavez of
intimidating journalists with his pronouncements and of sending gangs to
threaten journalists with physical violence. The media has tried to
embarrass Chavez internationally by taking its case to the Organization
of American States and to the U.S., which have responded favorably to
their complaints and have criticized Chavez for his supposed lack of
respect for human rights.
The other thing Chavez has done to combat the media is to exploit a law
which permits the government to take over all of the airwaves for
important government announcements. All TV and radio stations are
required to broadcast these announcements.
During the general strike Chavez decided to go all-out and interrupted
all TV and radio broadcasts numerous times during the strike. The
government's use of the airwaves has now provided additional ammunition
to the opposition and constituted an important factor in their deciding
to extend the strike from one day to two.
Chavez' greatest error has been his truly fundamental neglect for
cultivating a culture which would support his "Bolivarian Revolution,"
one which progressive sectors of civil society would support and promote
amongst the population and internationally, even against a strongly
Despite this grave fault of his presidency, Chavez continues to deserve
the support of progressives because the only alternative that has
presented itself until now is a return to the status quo ante, where the
upper class, together with selected sectors of the labor movement and
the government bureaucracy share Venezuela's oil pie amongst themselves,
leaving the poor, who constitute three quarters of Venezuela's
population, to fend for themselves.
Currently, however, the most immediate and most likely alternative to
Chavez is either a military coup or U.S. intervention, since Chavez
definitely won't resign and since he is legally in office at least until
the 2004, when a recall vote can be called. This means that progressives
around the world should act in solidarity with Chavez' government and
support him, if another Chile-style coup is to be avoided.
Gregory Wilpert lives in Caracas, is a former U.S. Fulbright scholar in
Venezuela, and is currently doing independent research on the sociology
Eres miembro de esta lista, pero...
¿sabes sacarle todo el provecho posible?
Si todavía no has registrado tu cuenta con eListas.net (el servicio
que te hace llegar este mensaje), visítanos en
¡Tenemos algo que contarte!